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NORTH DAKOTA LAW ]REVIEW
of constitutional provisions which differ from those of the United States Con-
stitution.1
3
The North Dakota Constitution 1 4 provides that private property shall not be
"taken or damaged" for public use without just compensation, and this has
been held to be broader than the guarantee of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution.15 Just compensation should then include not only
the value of the property condemned but also consequential losses attributable
thereto so that the owner would be put in as good a position pecuniarily as he
would have been had the property not been taken. 16
In the dissenting opinion of the instant case, moving costs are considered
consequential damnages.'; A North Dakota statutel ; has been interpreted to
provide for consequential losses arising from injuries to other property in
condennation proceedings. 1 9 Also, under the North Dakota constitutional
provision which requires payment of compensation when property is damaged,
consequential losses may be recovered. 2
0
Therefore, it would appear that with the authority from the interpretation
of the constitution and statutes by the North Dakota courts, there should be
no difficulty in disregarding the much criticized general rule and allowing
moving costs as an element of fair market value. This would follow the spirit
of the constitutional requirements for the payment of "just compensation."
G. EUGENE ISAAK.
LABOR RELATIONS - LABOR RELATION ACTS - PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT -
RIGHT OF POLICE OFFICERS TO UNIONIZE. - Officers of the Little Rock Po-
licemen's Union brought suit to enjoin the city officials from enforcing an act
requiring that persons be denied employment because of membership in a
labor union,' contending the act was unconstitutional due to Ark. Const.
Avenue, 294 Mich. 569, 293 N.W. 755 (1940); General Ice Cream Co. v. State, 99
N.Y.S.2d 312 (Ct.Cl. 1950).
13. Ill. Const. art. II, § 13, and Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 47, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1950) provide
that "private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just com-
pensation .... .. " See Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1888).
14. N.D. Const. art. I, § 14; see also, N.D. Rev. Code § 32-1501 (1943). In
cases where state constitutions provide that compensation must be paid for property "taken
or damaged," consequential damages may be recovered, 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain §
6.4432 (2) (1950).
15. Donaldson v. Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808 (1942).
16. See Walker v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 135 (Ct.C1. 1946); Martin v. Tyler, 4
N.D. 278, 60 N.W. 392 (1894); Donaldson v. Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808
(1942). N.D. Rev. Code § 32-1532 (Supp. 1957) allows, at the discretion of the
court, attorney's fees to the defendant condemnee, the general rule being that attorney's
fees are not allowed under condemnation statutes unless specifically provided for.
17. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
18. See N.D. Rev. Code 32-1522 (3) (1943).
19. See Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1957).
20. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. Von Bank, 72 N.D. 497, 8 N.W.2d 599 (1943);
Hamilton v. Bismarck, 71 N.D. 321, 300 N.W. 631 (1941); King v. Stark County, 67
N.D. 260, 271 N.W. 771 (1937) (North Dakota allows recovery when a person has sus-
tained direct, physical damages to his property in excess of that sustained by the public
generally).
1. Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947), Act 30 (1957) § 19-1715. Union membership by police
officers is inconsistent with the discipline which their employment requires and § 19-1716
of the same act provides that no person who is a member of a policemen's union shall be
eligible to serve on any municipal police force and that the union members currently serving
shall be dismissed unless they sever their relationship with the union within thirty days.
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amend. 34, Section 1.2 Appellants contended that an implied exception exclud-
ing public officials from the meaning of the amendment should be read into
the amendment. The Arkansas Supreme Court held, that public employment
was within the purview of the amendment, therefore the conflict between
the act and the amendment was irreconcilable, consequently the act must fall.:
Potts v. Hay, 318 S.W.2d 826 (Ark. 1958).
The right of public employees in general to organize labor unions is be-
coming increasingly recognized provided they do so with limited powers.
4
Municipal unionization appears generally to be limited to membership in a
union which bars strikes and does not seek to bargain collectively for public
employees, but merely tries to represent its members in the presentation of
grievances connected with their employment. "  In situations similar to the
instant case, however, it has been held that an ordinance prohibiting city em-
ployees from joining a labor union is not unconstitutional and void as de-
priving city employees of the freedoms, rights and privileges granted by state
constitutions.6 In another case involving an ordinance which conflicted with
a constitutional amendment making it lawful for all employees to organize
and become members of a labor union the court said that the statute had no
application to public employees.7
The right of union affiliation by municipal employees seems to be in a
state of development and has given rise to many conflicting opinions.8 Up to
the present time, however, with the exception of the instant case, there has
been great reluctance by the courts in allowing policemen and firemen to
unionize. The reason for this is that police and fire departments are usually
considered in a class apart from other public employees and to be associated
wtih an organization which in any way attempts to control their relations with
the municipality, has been held to be inconsistent with the discipline required
of them. 9 While the obligation of the members of the police force would be
superior to that of the union obligation, "so long as human nature is what it
is, a man cannot serve two masters." 10
2. Ark. Const. amend. 34, § 1, Rights of labor. "No person shall be denied employ-
ment because of membership in or affiliation with or resignation from a labor union, or
because of refusal to ioin or affiliate with a labor union; nor shall any corporation or in-
dividual or association of any kind enter into any contract, written or oral, to exclude
from employment members of a labor union, or those who refuse to join a labor union .... "
3. Justice Smith in the instant case said, "We are not convinced that the bare fact of
union membership on the part of police officers presents such a threat to the public welfare
that an implied exception must be written into the unqualified language of the consti-
tution."
4. See, e.g., Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947) (The
court said that public employees had no right to collective bargaining, but recognized
their right to join a union.); Broadwater v. Otto, 370 Pa. 611, 88 A.2d 878 (1952).
5. See Beverly v. Dallas, 292 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
6. See Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs. of Los Angeles, 78 Cal.App.2d 638, 178
P.2d 537 (1947) (Court upheld an order of the board forbidding police officers to be-
come or to continue as members of any labor union.); CIO v. Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143
(Tex. Civ. App. 1946) ("While city employees have a right to constitutional privileges
of freedoms, they have no constitutional right to remain in the services of the city in
violation of an ordinance prohibiting city employees from joining labor unions.").
7. McNatt v. Lawther, 223 S.W. 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (A labor union was
organized in the fire department of Dallas. Governing authorities directed the firemen
to disband the union or suffer dismissal-firemen refused and were dismissed, the court
upheld the dismissal.).
8. 25 Tenn. L. Rev. 511, 515 (1958).
9. See Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410 (1935); Hutchinson v.
Magee, 278 Pa. 119, 122 Ad. 234 (1923).
10. King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547 (1947).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIE[LA'
No cases directly involving a right-to-work law such as the one in the in-
stant case could be found, consequently it can only be left to conjecture as to
what the decision would be in North Dakota which also has a right-to-work
law similar to that of Arkansas."
From the standpoint of public policy it seems that unionization of police
officers would not be in the best interests of the community. Since public
employees if they do unionize, do not have the privilege to strike, bargain
collectively, picket or have a closed shop,12 it would appear to be of slight
advantage to be a member of a union. The possibility exists that the em-
ployees would be better served by having a local committee, elected from
their membership to discuss local wages, hours, working conditions, and in
this way present their problems to the proper public officials.
RICHARD J. RA-MACE.
MINES AND M~INERALS - LEASES, LICENSES, AND CONTRACTS - OIL AND
GAS LEASE TERMINATES UPON UNREASONABLE CESSATION OF PRODUCTION. -
Plaintiff purchased a leasehold estate existing under an oil and gas lease
covering property where there was one small producing well, and the terms
of the lease were for one year and as long thereafter as oil and gas were
produced. The primary term of the lease had expired, when the lessees
ceased production five or- six months prior to the purchase due to a dispute be-
tween themselves. The lessors contended that, with the voluntary cessation
of production the lease terminated. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, three
justices dissenting, held that the well had not been shut down for an unreason-
able length of time by the five or six month period, hence the lease had not
expired. Cotner v. Warren, 330 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1958).
In determining whether an oil or gas lease has been forfeited for breach of
covenant to market production, equity imposes a rigid standard of good faith
on the part of lessee, measured not only by lapse of time,' but by diligence
of the lessee.2
The court in the principal case, followed the Kentucky rule that the only
fair and just rule is "a lease continues in force unless the cessation period
viewed in light of all the circumstances is for an unreasonable time. ' '  In-
11. N. D. Rev. Code § 34-0114 (Supp. 1957) "The right of persons to work shall
not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor
union or labor organization, and all contracts in negation or abrogation of such right
are herehy declared to be invalid, void and unenforceable."
12. See Beverly v. Dallas, 292 SW.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
1. Bell v. Kilburn, 192 Ky. 809, 234 S.W. 730 (1921) (While courts usually dis-
favor forfeitures, gas and oil leases piesent a recognized exception to this rule, iased on
the view that because of their elusive and transitory character, time must be regarded
as the essence of the contr'ct).
2. Bristol v. Colo. Oil and Gas Corp., 225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955). (Under
Oklahoma law, actual production within definite tern. of an oil and gas lease which is to
extend as long as oil or gas is produced is not a condition precedent to extension of
lease beyond definite term, and lessee has a reasonable time to market after discovery
and expiration of definite term. But the lessee as condition precedent to extension in-
pliedly covenants to operate the validated lease in a prudent manner and with reasonable
diligence becaause the covenant necessarily embraces a duty to market production to mutual
advantage of lessor and lessee). Accord, Christianson v. Champlin Refining Co., 169 F.2d
207 (10th Cir. 1948).
3. Lamb v. Vansyckle, 205 Ky. 597, 266 S.W. 253 (1924). Compare with Louisi-
ana rule where, "in order to cancel the lease, there must be some evidence that the
wells thereon are no longer capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities; or that
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